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Abstract
We will begin by analyzing the history of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
discuss the context of the two recently published decisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review FISCR, respectively, be-
fore analyzing the In re Sealed Case decision in light of the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Ultimately, we conclude that FISA, as amended by Congress in the USA PATRIOT Act, and
as interpreted by the FISCR, is unconstitutional in that it offends the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is a Nation in transformation. The hi-
jackers who attacked the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon
on September 11, 2001, set in motion a chain of events, which
have undermined the constitutional limits of executive power.
Sadly, though not surprisingly, President George W. Bush and
his administration have taken advantage of the fear generated by
these terrorists (along with a fateful confluence of historical and
political forces) and, through a series of bold moves, have
amassed unprecedented power in the Executive Branch.' No-
where is that consolidation of executive power more evident
than in the forces being brought to bear against U.S. persons
(citizens and lawful resident aliens) by Attorney General John
Ashcroft and the U.S. Department of Justice. Detention of U.S.
persons without charge, access to counsel, meaningful judicial
review, or even the ability to communicate with loved ones -
powers more appropriately associated with totalitarian regimes
- are now vigorously defended by the U.S. government.2 In ad-
dition, with the assistance of the other two branches of govern-
* The authors wish to thank Jed Iverson, Elizabeth Meyers, Trina Tinglun, Mary
Wells, and Rick Goheen for their assistance in researching this Article and for their
patience with our incessant requests.
1. This should come as no surprise, for the very structure of our government
presumes that each branch will vie for power against the others. From the birth of our
Republic, the Framers recognized the enormous temptation each branch would feel to
assume as much power to itself as was possible. "[E]xperience assures us that the effi-
cacy of the provision [of merely marking the boundaries of power] has been greatly
overrated." James Madison, FEDER, LISr No. 48, at 146 (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.
1966). See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003). It is sad, however,
because the powers being assumed by the Executive Branch today are amassed chiefly
at the expense of the People.
2. See, e.g., CNN.coM, Asheroft: Critics of New Terror Measures Undermine Effort, Dec. 7,
2001, available at http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/12/06/inv.ashcroft.hearing/ [here-
inafter Ash-roft Statements]; see also Brief for Government, Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 316 F.3d
450 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-6895), available at http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/
terrorism/cases/index.html; Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02-4445), available at
http://iews.findlaw.com/legaliiews/us/terrorism/cases/index.html.
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ment, the Executive has amassed dramatic new surveillance pow-
ers, previously deemed intolerable under both the Fourth
Amendment and federal statutes, for use in investigating sus-
pected criminal offenses.' These unprecedented new powers
signal nothing less than the transformation of the U.S. govern-
ment from one of limited, enumerated, and balanced powers, to
one of extra-constitutional authority whose justification resides
in a purported state of emergency.
These new powers being exercised in the United States sur-
prisingly mirror, in many ways, those being exercised in North-
ern Ireland, and more generally, in the United Kingdom
("UK").' This is surprising because Northern Ireland and the
UK are emerging from a period defined by emergency and the
threat of terrorism into a time that promised more stability and
normalcy. In fact, recently passed legislation permitting a broad
range of surveillance activity in the UK, promised to protect
human rights and act as a check upon the government's surveil-
lance powers. Under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers
Act 2000 ("RIPA"), 6 however, the incidence of wiretaps and mail
openings has skyrocketed.7 While some "emergency" UK legisla-
tion was passed following the World Trade Center attacks,' RIPA
and the Terrorism Act 2000' are permanent pieces of legislation,
3. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, "USA PATRIOT Act," Pub. L. No. 107-56, Sec.
202, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001).
4. Both governments and societies are in transition and both can learn much from
the other's experience. One lesson the United States should carefully consider is how
frequently "emergency" powers become permanent, whether de facto or de jure. In
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, emergency legislation was repeatedly
renewed, becoming defacto permanent. See, e.g., Emergency Provisions Acts of 1973,
1978, 1987, 1991 and 1996 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Acts (Eng.); see also Committee on the Administration of Justice, No Emergency, No Emer-
gency Laws: Emergency Legislation Related to Northern Ireland - the Case for Repeal (Mar.
1995), available at http://www.caj.org.uk/PublicationsCatalogue.htm#criminal;
Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rumann, Into the Fire, 24 CARDOZO L. REV._ (forthcom-
ing 2003). Finally, many of these powers were made permanent de jure through the
Terrorism Act 2000 (Eng.).
5. See Explanatory Notes to Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Summary and
Background, available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/enl/2000en.
6. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23 (Eng.).
7. See STATEWATCH NEWS ONLINE, UK Surveillance of communications goes through the
roof, available at h ttp: / /www.statewatch.org/ news/ 2003/jan/ I Iukteltap.htm.
8. See e.g., Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, ch. 24 (Eng.), available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm#aofs.
9. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. II (Eng.).
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granting broad investigatory powers to the government, whose
existence is not contingent upon a state of emergency. The UK
government responded to the September 11 attacks by aggres-
sively using these powers and justifying their expansion and so-
lidification." This development in the UK mirrors, in process
and substance, the new and dramatic exercise of executive
power in the United States.
This, of course, is not the first time that one branch of the
U.S. government has assumed powers which were not explicitly
granted to it by the Constitution. U.S. history is replete with ex-
amples of one branch encroaching upon the powers appropri-
ately reserved to one of the other two coequal branches."1 It is
also not unique for the Executive to exercise extra-constitutional
powers to the detriment of our citizens' civil liberties.1 2  One
need not look too far into the past to see examples of the Execu-
tive Branch running afoul of the constitutional limits on its
power and justifying these excesses in the name of national se-
10. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, United Kingdom: Rights Denied: the UKs Response to
11 September 2001, available at http://www.statewatch.org.
11. See e.g., I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that the Legislature
improperly assumed veto power of the Executive); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986) (invalidating congressional intrusion on Executive Branch); Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding that Congress may
not give away Article Ill 'judicial" power to an Article I judge); Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding that Congress cannot limit President's power to remove
Executive Branch official).
12. While there are many examples of the abuse of executive power to the detri-
ment of civil liberties, perhaps none is more relevant to some of the powers being exer-
cised by the current Bush Administration than the internment of Japanese-Americans
during World War II. In recent years, it has become practically an article of faith that
what was done to Japanese Americans was both disgraceful and unlawful. See Civil Lib-
erties Act of 1988, Restitution for World War I1 Internment of the Japanese Americans
and Aleuts, 50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 1989. That Section states:
The purposes of this Act are to-
(1) acknowledge the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and
internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens ofiapa-
nese ancestry during World War 11;
(2) apologize on behalf of the people of the United States for the evacuation,
relocation, and internment of such citizens and permanent resident aliens;
(3) provide for a public education fund to finance efforts to inform the public
about the internment of such individuals so as to prevent the recurrence of any
similar event.
Id. (emphasis added). It must be noted however, that both Congress and the federal
courts during World War 11 supported the Executive's internment of Japanese-Ameri-
cans. See Korematsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
2003] GOING, GOING, GONE 1237
curity." Nevertheless, the Bush Administration is pursuing ex-
traordinary powers with such vigor, that these actions are prop-
erly characterized as unprecedented in their disregard for any
constitutional or statutory limitations. 4 While the range of ex-
tra-constitutional powers assumed by the Bush Administration
has been broad, affecting even the most basic rights to counsel,
access to the courts, and to be informed of the nature of the
charges against oneself, the newly assumed powers of surveil-
lance may eventually prove to be the most corrosive of liberty
and the rule of law in this Nation. 5
A recent, historic decision by the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court of Review ("FISCR"), In re Sealed Case, has ex-
panded to criminal investigations the broad scope of surveil-
lance powers previously available only for foreign intelligence in-
vestigations.' 6 Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA"), broadened surveillance powers were granted to investi-
13. The Nixon Administration's misconduct during the Watergate scandal directly
contributed to the limitations placed upon executive action under the Foreign Intelli-
gence Service Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (hereinafter FISA]. The
Iran-Contra Affair is another of the more notorious of such episodes in recent U.S.
history. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1305-17 (1988).
14. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L REV. 953 (2002) ("The USA PA-
TRIOT Act gives the Attorney General unprecedented power to detain aliens without a
hearing and without a showing that they pose a threat to national security or a flight
risk.").
15. To date, Congress has accommodated the Administration, and the judiciary
has acquiesced in this encroachment upon the civil liberties of U.S. persons. This ongo-
ing shift of power within the federal government raises serious questions about the
operation of fundamental checks and balances within our tripartite system of govern-
ment. These important issues and the related separation of powers questions raised by
the Executive's actions are beyond the scope of this paper. However, other issues con-
cerning the appropriate checks and balances placed upon the Executive, that are inex-
tricably linked to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, will be analyzed
when discussing how the changes to FISA offend the dictates of that Amendment.
16. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002). The deci-
sion is historic in two important ways. First, it is the only decision ever issued by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("FICSR") in the twenty-four-year his-
tory of that court. This is particularly significant because it means that the government,
the only party appearing in the lower Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"),
has never had reason to appeal a single decision of the FISC. Second, the decision is
historic because it turns on its head the entire rationale of previous federal court deci-
sions upholding searches under FISA. Those previous decisions of various federal dis-
trict courts and federal courts of appeal relied upon the limitation requiring searches
under FISA to be conducted only during investigations whose primary purpose was to
gather foreign intelligence information. See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59
(2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1991).
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gators, whose primary purpose is to gather foreign intelligence
information. 7 These surveillance powers were permitted upon
a standard less than that required under the Fourth Amend-
ment, because the purpose of the investigation was to gather for-
eign intelligence information, rather than the investigation of
criminal activity. In re Sealed Case has turned the rationale of
FISA on its head, and permitted the government to use these
expansive powers of surveillance when the government's primary
purpose is law enforcement.8
It is these newly asserted powers of surveillance that are the
focus of this Article. While many issues are raised by the use of
these newly expanded powers, including their use against targets
identified solely on the basis of lawful activities, the primary fo-
cus of this analysis will be on how In re Sealed Case granted to the
Executive broad surveillance powers which offend the dictates of
the Fourth Amendment."' We will begin by analyzing the history
of the FISA, discuss the context of the two recently published
decisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
("FISC") and the FISCR, respectively, before analyzing the In re
Sealed Case decision in light of the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.
Ultimately, we conclude that FISA, as amended by Congress
in the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
17. FISA, Pub. L. No. 95-511, Sec. 104. FISA surveillance powers are extraordinary
in many ways, which are detailed in the sections below. Among the substantial differ-
ences from ordinary surveillance powers conducted pursuant to the Fourth Amend-
ment and Title Ill of the United States Code ("U.S.C."), are the following: surveillance
permitted without any showing (of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion) that
evidence of criminal activity will be discovered; surveillance approved through ex parte
secret proceedings, which are never revealed to a defendant challenging the introduc-
tion of evidence against him; warrantless surveillance permitted; surveillance not lim-
ited by requirements of particularity; and surveillance permitted over long periods of
time which are potentially open-ended.
18. Congress' role in this intrusion on civil liberties is more than de minimus.
Under the provisions of the inaptly named USA PATRIOT Act, Congress amended the
FISA to permit such surveillance where foreign intelligence information was "a signifi-
cant purpose" of the investigation. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Sec. 202;
see aLw O'Connor & Rumann, supra n.4. On March 6, 2003, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee approved legislation to allow FISA surveillance of people believed to be "lone
wolf" terrorists, even if no evidence connected them to a specific terrorist group or a
foreign power that supported terrorism. See Bill Status of S. 113, available at http://
thomas.loc.gov.
19. First Amendment issues will be discussed insofar as they relate to the history of
and purposes behind the Fourth Amendment.
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priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
("USA PATRIOT Act"), and as interpreted be the FISCR, is un-
constitutional in that it offends the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.
I. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. History of the FISA
FISA was passed in 1978. It authorized "applications for a
court order approving the use of electronic surveillance to ob-
tain foreign intelligence information. '' 21  It was passed in re-
sponse to the Church Committee's review of the Nixon Adminis-
tration's surveillance of the activities of political opponents, in-
cluding the Democratic Party, under the guise of national
security.2' Through FISA, Congress attempted to limit the pro-
pensity of the Executive Branch to engage in abusive or politi-
cally motivated surveillance. FISA was Congress's attempt to bal-
ance the "competing demands of the President's constitutional
powers to gather intelligence deemed necessary to the security
of the Nation, and the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
22
Prior to the enactment of FISA, beginning with the Admin-
istration of Franklin Roosevelt, the Executive Branch asserted an
"inherent" authority to engage in surveillance for foreign intelli-
21gence purposes. Successive Administrations asserted that this
authority arose under the foreign affairs powers delegated to the
Executive Branch by the Constitution.24 Various members of
Congress disputed this assertion, 25 and legislation to address
this dispute initially stated that the Executive Branch had no
20. S. Rep. 95-701, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973.
21. S. Rep. 95-701, 709. See also Ira Shapiro, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act:
Legislative Balancing of National Security and the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
119, 120 (1977-78); David Johnston, Administration Begins to Rewrite Decades-Old Spying
Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2002, at Al.
22. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, at 15.
23. See Shapiro, supra n.21.
24. See, e.g., Americo R. Conquegrana, The Walls, (and Wires) have Ears: The Back-
ground and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 793, 794 (1989).
25. See Shapiro, supra n.21, at 121 "In the wake of revelations about Watergate
Senators Nelson (D-Wis.), Kennedy (D-Mass.), and Mathias (R-Md), asserting that the
President had no authority to disregard the Fourth Amendment in national security
cases, introduced legislation to prohibit warrantless electronic surveillance."
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such authority. FISA, as passed, was a compromise between
these competing views. 2 1 It limited the authority of the Execu-
tive, asserting a check on its power by requiring it to obtain judi-
cial authorization before it could engage in surveillance for "the
purpose" of gathering foreign intelligence information.
Originally, FISA, by its terms, was limited to electronic sur-
veillance. 27 However, in 1994, FISA was amended to apply to
physical searches as well.28
B. History of the FISC
The FISC was established by FISA. It originally consisted of
seven judges, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.2 The PATRIOT Act expanded the number of judges
serving to eleven.3" These judges are charged with reviewing sur-
veillance applications submitted under FISA and determining
whether the applications meet the requirements for the issuance
of a warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance." Such applica-
tions are submitted and orders are issued ex parte.3 2 As such, the
only party that can appeal the decision to issuance, modify, or
deny any application, is the government.
Between 1979 and 2001, there were 14,036 applications for
FISA surveillances or searches." During that time period, all but
26. For a thorough discussion of the competing interests and the evolution of Bills
that eventually became FISA, see Conquegrana, supra n.24, at 794.
27. This changed after the Administration requested, and the FISC refused to au-
thorize, a warrant requesting a physical search. See Report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, United States Senate, Implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (1980-81). The FISC denied the request because by its term and as confirmed
in the legislative history, physical searches were not authorized under the FISA. See id.
See also In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Physical Search of
Nonresidential Premises and Personal Property (June 11, 1981), reprinted in Report of the
Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, supra.
28. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, Sec.
807(b), 108 Stat. 3423, 3453 (1994).
29. FISA, Pub. L. No. 95-511, Sec. 103.
30. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Sec. 208.
31. 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1803(a).
32. Id.
33. See generally Annual Reports of the Attorney General, available at http://
fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa. These Annual Reports list the annual number of warrant
applications and the decisions of the FISC on those requests. The authors have com-
plied the numbers contained in these reports for the totals listed here. Of these appli-
cations, only four were modified by the court before issuing the warrant. One of these
modifications actually expanded the request, authorizing "an activity for which court
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one of these requests were granted. 34 Only four of these previ-
ous applications have been modified before being issued 5.3  In-
deed, even In re All Matters, the 2002 decision by the FISC that
dealt with the minimization procedures, and was appealed by
the government in In re Sealed Case, did not deny the requested
application.36 It granted the application with modification to
the proposed minimization procedures.37
II. ARTICLE III COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF FISA
A. Changes to FISA in the USA PATRIOT Act
The PATRIOT Act contained many changes to the FISA.
These changes were some of the most controversial contained in
that piece of legislation. 38 This Article focuses on the change in
the PATRIOT Act that the FISCR addressed in its opinion. Spe-
cifically, we analyzed the FISCR interpretation of the effect of
the amendment that changed the requirement that foreign in-
telligence be "the purpose" of the surveillance to merely requir-
ing that it be "a significant purpose."
As originally drafted and implemented over its twenty-four -
authority had not been requested." Annual Report of the Attorney General, Apr. 22,
1981, available at http:/ / fas.org/ irp/agency/doj/fisa/1980rept.html.
34. See generally Annual Reports of the Attorney General 1979-2001, available at
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa. These numbers are all the more astonishing when
one considers the revelations by the FISC, noting the concern for misrepresentation by
the government. These numbers are particularly interesting given the information con-
tained in the FISC decision, noting that on seventy-five occasions, the government con-
fessed error relating to "misstatements and omissions of material facts" it had made in
its FISA applications. Indeed, the FISC took the extraordinary step of preventing one
FBI agent from appearing before it as an affiant. In re All Matters Submitted to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 621 (Foreign Int. Surv.
Ct. 2002) [hereinafter In re All Matters].
35. Annual Reports of the Attorney General 1979-2001, supra n.33. Interestingly,
one of these four modifications involved the government being given broader surveil-
lance capability than even requested.
36. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 720.
37. It should also be noted that the FISCR jurisdiction is limited to appeals of
denials. 50 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1803(b). In spite of this fact, that court reviewed the granting
of a FISA surveillance order and went beyond this. In the absence of any statutory
authority, the FISCR ruled on a question that had never been presented to the FISC:
whether the purpose requirement as amended by the PATRIOT Act was constitutional.
38. As the lone dissenting Senatorial vote on the PATRIOT Act, Senator Russ Fein-
gold explained how "troubled" he was "by the broad expansion of government power"
under FISA. He summed up his objections to the changes to the FISA by stating: "This
is a truly breathtaking expansion of police power." 147 CONG. REC. S10,990 (2001)
(statement of Sen. Feingold).
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year history, FISA applications were only properly granted when
"the purpose" of the surveillance was foreign intelligence gather-
ing." Under the PATRIOT Act changes, a warrant under FISA
would now issue, so long as "a significant purpose" of the surveil-
lance was foreign intelligence.' This minor change of language
has had a dramatic impact on its use. Now, for the first time in
history, the government can conduct surveillance to gather evi-
dence for use in a criminal case, so long as it presents a non-
reviewable assertion that it also has a significant interest in the
target for foreign intelligence purposes.
B. In re Sealed Case: The Rarest of the Rare, a Published Decision by
the FISCR
1. Lower Court Decision
On May 17, 2002, the FISC issued a rare public and unani-
mous opinion.4 In that case, the government had sought to
conduct surveillance of an "agent of a foreign power. '4 2 The
FISC granted that request." However, in granting the request,
the FISC also addressed the propriety of the government's pro-
posed minimization procedures under FISA.44 It is important to
note that the FISC specifically limited its analysis to the question
before it, stating that it was not "reaching the question of
whether FISA may be used primarily for law enforcement pur-
poses."4 5 In resolving the minimization question, the FISC cata-
logued the opportunities for and methods of coordination and
information-sharing under the 1995 minimization procedures,
as augmented in January 2000 and August 2001.46
However, because FISA required the FBI Director to certify
that "the purpose" of any proposed surveillance was the collec-
tion of foreign intelligence information, the FISC decision ad-
39. See FISA, Pub. L. No. 95-511, Sec. 104(a) (7) (B).
40. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Sec. 218.
41. In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. at 621.
42. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 720.
43. Id.
44. In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 613. Minimization procedures are those
steps designed to minimize the acquisition and retention of information learned about
non-consenting United States persons, and to prohibit the unlawful dissemination of
this information. 50 U.S.C. Secs. 1801(h) and 1821(4).
45. Id. at 615, n.2. This is important to note because the FISCR did not so limit its
review.
46. Id. at 619.
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dressed its longstanding practice of being "routinely apprised of
consultations and discussion between the FBI, the Criminal Divi-
sion, and the U.S. Attorney's offices in cases where there were
overlapping intelligence and criminal investigations *or inter-
ests."4 7 To ensure that FISA surveillances and searches remained
limited to foreign intelligence cases and "were not being used
sub rosa for criminal investigations," the FISC had routinely ap-
proved "information screening 'walls"' in such cases.4 8 How-
ever, the FISC noted that in September 2000, the government
admitted that in seventy-five previous FISA applications relating
to terrorism, the government had made "misstatements and
omissions of material facts."4"
It was within this frame of reference that the FISC consid-
ered whether newly proposed minimization procedures were ad-
equate to meet the statutory requirements. It concluded that
they were not. The FISC noted that "It]he 2002 procedures ap-
pear to be designed to amend the law and substitute FISA for
Title III electronic surveillances and Rule 41 searches. "150 It
noted that the effect of this would be that "criminal prosecutors
will tell the FBI when to use FISA (perhaps when they lack prob-
able cause for a Title III electronic surveillance), what tech-
niques to use, what information to look for, what information to
keep as evidence, and when use of FISA can cease because there
is enough evidence to arrest and prosecute. '"5 1 As such, it held
that portions of the proposed minimization procedures were
"NOT reasonably designed," consistent with the need of the gov-
ernment "'to obtain, produce, or disseminate foreign intelli-
gence information' as defined in § 1801(h) and § 1821(4) of
the" FISA.5
The government objected to this limitation on the role that
law enforcement could play in foreign intelligence gathering. As
such, it filed the first ever appeal to a court that had never
before met - the FISCR.
47. Id. at 619-620.
48. Id. at 620.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 623.
51. Id. at 624.
52. Id. at 625 (emphasis in the original).
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2. Appellate Decision
On November 18, 2002, the FISCR issued its first opinion."
It based this decision on the briefs and arguments presented by
the government, and two amicus curiae briefs filed by the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union and the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers.54 The FISCR opinion reversed the deci-
sion of the FISC, to the extent that the FISC "imposed condi-
tions on the grant of the government's applications."5 In a
decision that Attorney General John Ashcroft recognized as so
revolutionary, that he called it "a giant step forward,"5 the
FISCR reversed twenty years of court decisions and Justice De-
partment policy. Though praised by the Department of Justice,
this decision raised concerns for civil libertarians and was quickly
criticized.5 7
In this decision, the FISCR purported to be addressing an
appeal of the minimization question decided by the FISC.5"
Whatever the propriety of the decision to review the granting of
an application with modification, the FISCR did not limit itself
to this question. Indeed, it spent very little time addressing the
minimization question. The FISCR spent much of its opinion
53. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 717.
54. Id. at 710. See also Brief on Behalf of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties
Union, Center for Democracy and Technology, Center for National Security Studies,
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Open Soci-
ety Institute In Support of' Affirmance, available at http://archive.aclu.org/news/2002/
n092002a.html; Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers in Support of Affirmance, available at http://www.criminaljustice.org/
public.nsf/newsreleases/2002mnO45?opendocnment.
55. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746.
56. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General John Ashcroft's Press Conference re: For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (Nov. 18, 2002), in State Dep't Press
Releases & Documents, available at 2002 WL 25973318. See also Adam Liptak, In the
Name of Security, Privacy for Me, Not Thee, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002, Sec. 4, at 1.
57. See, e.g., Editorial, A Green Light to Spy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2002, at A30; D.
Hudson, Jr., Unusual Appeals Process in Wiretap Case, I A.B.A. J. 45 (2002). These criti-
cisms have ranged from concerns about the objectivity of a court "hand-picked by Chief
Justice Rehnquist" and consisting entirely of Reagan appointees, to the secret and one-
sided nature of the proceedings, to the inability of anyone to file an appeal to the
substantive decision and its interpretation by the Justice Department.
58. There are serious jurisdictional questions raised by the court's review of this
case, since the FISC granted the application in question, with modification to the mini-
mization procedures. See 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1803(b). Additional jurisdictional questions
are raised by the scope of the court's analysis, which includes issues not raised or de-
cided in the court below. These questions are clearly important, but are beyond the
scope of this Article.
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discussing the question that was specifically not addressed by the
FISC, namely whether both pre- and post-PATRIOT Act FISA
may be used primarily for law enforcement purposes. It also ad-
dressed the Fourth Amendment questions inherent in any find-
ing that FISA orders could be obtained in cases where the objec-
tive of the investigation is a criminal prosecution, rather than
foreign intelligence gathering.
59
On the question of pre-PATRIOT Act FISA, the FISCR ig-
nored the plain language of the statute, as enacted, which very
clearly required, among other things, that the applications con-
tain a certification "that the purpose of the surveillance is to ob-
tain foreign intelligence information. 60 Instead, the FISCR fo-
cused on the definition of "foreign intelligence information,"
which means information that is "necessary to the ability of the
United States to protect against" sabotage, international terror-
ism or clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power.""1 Because an "agent of a foreign
power" circularly defines itself as anyone who "knowingly en-
gages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on
behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve
a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States," and the
definitions of "sabotage" and "international terrorism" similarly
refer to violations of criminal law,"2 the FISCR concluded that
FISA was never meant to prohibit its use in criminal cases.
In support of this conclusion, the FISCR quoted from the
Congressional record, including the Senate Report on FISA at
the time of its passage. The FISCR includes a long quote from
the Senate Report which notes that "intelligence and criminal
law enforcement tend to merge in this area ... [S]urveillances
conducted under [FISA] need not stop once conclusive evi-
dence of a crime is obtained, but instead may be extended
longer where protective measures other than arrest and prosecu-
59. The FISCR summarily overlooked statutorily-constructed restrictions of its ju-
risdiction to "review of the denial of any application" to address issues that it admits
have "never previously been advanced either before a court or Congress." In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d at 721. It announces that since the proceedings are exparte it "can enter-
tain an argument supporting the government's position not presented to the lower
court." Id. at n.6.
60. 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1804 (a)(7)(B).
61. 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1801 (e)(1)(B).
62. 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1801 (b)(2)(A), (C).
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tion are appropriate.
Edited from this quote by the FISCR is the Congressional
indication of the appropriate balance in this area, where intelli-
gence and criminal law enforcement merge. The Senate made
clear that where these objectives merge, " [t] he targeting of U.S.
persons and the overlap with criminal law enforcement require
close attention to traditional Fourth Amendment principles."64
Instead of heeding this admonition to pay close attention to
traditional Fourth Amendment principles, the FISCR did the op-
posite. It decided that because there was an overlap of intelli-
gence and criminal law objectives, the limited protections of
FISA would prevail over traditional Fourth Amendment require-
ments. Thus, the FISCR concluded that foreign intelligence
never really needed to be the primary purpose under FISA, as
originally enacted.
Rather than stop there, the FISCR went further. It ad-
dressed the issue newly presented by the government's argument
- that whether originally required or not, given that the PA-
TRIOT Act amended FISA to state that "the purpose" need only
be "a significant purpose" - the government could now use FISA
even if its primary purpose was criminal investigations, rather
than foreign intelligence investigations. The FISCR had no
trouble concluding that this was the intent behind the amend-
ments to FISA contained in the PATRIOT Act.
So concluding, the FISCR then addressed the Fourth
Amendment problems inherent in such an analysis. It suggested
that although FISA's requirements for a surveillance order are
different than those under Title III, "few of those differences
have constitutional relevance."6 It went so far as to suggest that
in some ways, FISA provides greater protections than does a Title
III warrant."' FISCR stated that "while Title III contains some
protections that are not in FISA, in many significant respects the
two statutes are equivalent, and in some, FISA contains addi-
63. In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725 (emphasis in the original).
64. S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 10-11 (1978) (ellipse in the original).
65. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 737. For example, the FISCR summarily concludes
that a "FISA judge satisfies the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a 'neutral and
detached magistrate."' Id.
66. Id. at 739 ("Nevertheless, FISA provides additional protections to ensure that
only pertinent information is sought.").
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tional protections. 6 7
One of the interesting anomalies of its Fourth Amendment
analysis is that after spending much of the opinion deciding that
FISA never has required, and does not now require, foreign in-
telligence gathering to be the primary purpose for the surveil-
lance, FICSR asserted that FISA meets Fourth Amendment stan-
dards because of the differences between the investigative needs
and objectives in foreign intelligence investigations and those in
criminal cases governed by Title II.68 For example, in discuss-
ing the expanded duration for FISA warrants, as compared to
Title III warrants, FISCR noted that "[t]his difference is based
on the nature of national security surveillance, which is 'often
long range and involves the interrelation of various sources and
types of information."69
Ultimately, FISCR sidestepped thorny points and glossed
over any meaningful analysis of Fourth Amendment law. For ex-
ample, FISCR did not decide whether a FISA order is a "war-
rant," as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.t  Instead, it
analyzed the question of whether "FISA, as amended by the PA-
TRIOT Act, is a reasonable response based on a balance of the
legitimate need of the government for foreign intelligence infor-
mation to protect against national security threats with the pro-
tected rights of citizens. '"71 In conducting this analysis, FISCR
dismissed the holding of United States v. Troung.72
Troung held that evidence obtained through warrantless
searches and surveillances of a defendant after an investigation
had become primarily criminal investigations, was inadmissi-
ble.73 FISCR determined that the Troung decision rested on a
"false premise" that foreign intelligence gathering is distinct
67. Id. at 741. It must be noted that this "additional protection" is the involvement
of the Attorney General.
68. Id. at 737-42.
69. Id. at 740. In a twist of irony, the FISCR asserted that "this longer surveillance
period is balanced by continuing FISA Court oversight of minimization procedures dur-
ing that period." This came after the portion of the opinion in which the court deter-
mined that the wall that the FISC had held as a necessary component of those proce-
dures, was not permitted because criminal prosecutions could now be the objective for
the surveillance.
70. Id. at 74142.
71. Id. at 742.
72. United States v. Troting, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
73. See id.
2003] 1247
1248 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:1234
from criminal investigations."4 It opined that this line was "in-
herently unstable, unrealistic, and confusing."75 Although the
FISCR noted that the FBI in its pre-9/11 terrorism investigations
may have misunderstood the dictates of Troung, the FISCR sug-
gested that the requirements based on Troung may have contrib-
uted "to the FBI missing opportunities to anticipate the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 attacks."76
After rejecting the lesson of Troung, the FISCR analyzed the
"special needs" cases. "Special needs" cases are those where the
Supreme Court has found it appropriate to carve out an excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause,
based upon an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. In these
cases, the Court found that "special needs, beyond the normal
need of law enforcement," mightjustify an otherwise unconstitu-
tional search.7 7 It specifically considered the recent Supreme
Court case of City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.7" In that case, the
Supreme Court held that "a highway checkpoint designed to
catch drug dealers did not fit within its special needs exception
because the government's 'primary purpose' was merely 'to un-
cover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.""'7  The
FISCR, on the other hand, reasoned that because subjective in-
tent "is not relevant in ordinary Fourth Amendment probable
cause analysis," it was the "programmatic purpose" that was de-
terminative."
Ignoring its own conclusion on the purpose question, the
FISCR then concluded that because "FISA's general program-
matic purpose" is foreign intelligence gathering, as distin-
guished from what it called, without defining, "ordinary crime
control," FISA, as amended, is constitutional because the surveil-
lances it authorizes are "reasonable."'"
74. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 743.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 744. For a discussion of the FBI's implementation of FISA, see generally,
Interim Report of F31 Oversight in the 107th Congress by the Senate Judiciay Committee: FISA
Inplementation Failures (Feb. 2003), available at, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/
2003_rpt/fisa.html.
77. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
78. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
79. In re Sealed Case, 301 F.3d at 745 (citing Edmond).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 746.
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III. TRANSITION TO EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
FOR SURVEILLANCE
A. FISA Modifications, the Primary Purpose Requirement, and the
Fourth Amendment
The modifications of FISA, as contained in the PATRIOT
Act and as interpreted by FISCR in In re Sealed Case, raise several
fundamental problems under the Fourth Amendment. Searches
conducted pursuant to these provisions, which are not primarily
for foreign intelligence purposes, cannot pass constitutional
muster. The conclusion to the contrary by the FISCR in In re
Sealed Case is predicated upon internally inconsistent logic, selec-
tive editing and application of judicial decisions and statutory
language, and a disregard for the legislative history of FISA.82
The reasoning of the court in In re Sealed Case is most gener-
ously described as internally inconsistent. The court's two fun-
damental premises for its ruling - namely that FISA never con-
tained a purpose requirement, and that in altering the purpose
requirement, Congress did nothing to undermine the validity of
searches conducted pursuant to FISA - are facially inconsis-
tent. 3 In addition to contradicting each other, the court's argu-
ments are individually based upon specious reasoning, compart-
mentalization of related items, and omissions of essential infor-
mation. The result of this fuzzy logic is a picture that remains
out of focus and out of step with Fourth Amendment law. In this
section, we will attempt to clarify the picture and place the In re
Sealed Case decision in its proper context by analyzing the history
of the Fourth Amendment in relation to foreign intelligence in-
vestigations. We will begin by providing a brief history of the
application of Fourth Amendment protections to criminal wire-
tapping surveillance, move on to discuss the ways in which for-
82. There have been numerous challenges raised to the validity of the FISA pro-
ceedings that may have increased validity in light of the changes to FISA, enacted
through the PATRIOT Act and the ruling of the FISCR in In re Sealed Case. Most of
these arguments are beyond the scope of this Article, which is focused on the Fourth
Amendment aspects of FISA, which have been changed by the PATRIOT Act, as inter-
preted in In re Sealed Case.
83. Even the FISCR recognized this fact, but suggested without directly stating it,
that Congress, when it enacted the PATRIOT Act, was itself confused about the purpose
requirement. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732-33. The artificial separation of these
issues will not be repeated in our analysis of the Fourth Amendment implications of In
re Sealed Case.
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eign intelligence investigations are permitted to operate under a
different set of rules, and finally analyze the ways in which In re
Sealed Case confused these two sets of rules, permitting the Exec-
utive to engage in widespread snooping on U.S. persons, unfet-
tered by constitutional constraints.
B. The Courts, Congress, and Wiretapping Under the
Fourth Amendment
In many ways, the greatest flaw in the In re Sealed Case deci-
sion is its failure to recognize a pattern of interaction among the
Executive, the Judiciary, and the Legislature in the area of elec-
tronic surveillance. For the better part of eighty years, this pat-
tern has consisted of executive encroachment into the private
lives of U.S. persons through the use of new technologies, 4 a
court decision outlining the current legal constraints operating
on the Executive, and Congress responding to the Court's deci-
sions through legislation.
In the first of the major wiretap decisions, Olmstead v. United
States, 5 Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, held that wire-
tap surveillance did not amount to a search and seizure and,
therefore, was not governed by the Fourth Amendment."' Writ-
ing in dissent, Justice Brandeis recognized that:
[t] he evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone
is far greater than that involved in tampering with the mails.
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the per-
sons at both ends of the line is invaded, and all conversations
between them upon any subject, and although proper, confi-
dential, and privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tap-
ping of one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the
telephone of every other person whom he may call, or who
may call him. As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and
general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and op-
pression when compared with wire-tapping.
8 7
84. This encroachment is sometimes taken pursuant to legislative authorization
and sometimes without such authorization. Compare Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In either event, Congress has
repeatedly responded to Supreme Court decisions by enacting legislation, which recog-
nizes the holdings of the Court. This pattern is of course reasonable and quite familiar.
Yet, the FISCR ignores this dynamic when analyzing In re Sealed Case.
85. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis,]., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 475-76. Justice Brandeis went on to provide a cautionary note, which,
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Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion was the first recognition by
a member of the Supreme Court that the unconstrained inva-
sion of privacy inherent in wiretapping, provides a dangerous
weapon for the government, which needs to be checked by the
Fourth Amendment if we are to remain free from "tyranny and
oppression." Chief Justice Taft rested the majority's decision
upon the plain language of the Fourth Amendment, which pro-
tects material things - "the person, the house, his papers or his
effects."88 Yet, Chief Justice Taft was not blind to the potential
dangers identified by Justice Brandeis and invited Congress to
enact legislation, which would protect the secrecy of phone con-
versations by making their introduction inadmissible in federal
criminal trials.89
Congress took up this invitation and passed the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 which stated that no person could
"intercept any communication and divulge or publish" this com-
munication without the consent of the recorded party." The
focus on divulging or publishing intercepted communications
permitted the Executive to continue gathering information
through wiretaps; it merely prohibited its introduction into fed-
eral criminal trials.9 '
For nearly forty years after Olmstead, courts would treat wire-
taps as belonging outside the purview of the Fourth Amend-
ment." A pair of decisions by the Supreme Court in 1967 al-
tered this analysis and placed wiretap surveillance firmly within
the confines of the Fourth Amendment. In Katz v. United States,
the Supreme Court rejected its holding in Olmstead along with
the Executive's request to create an exception to the warrant re-
unfortunately, is often forgotten by the courts and public alike: "Experience should
teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes
are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their lib-
erty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroach-
ment by men of zeal, well-meaning, but without understanding." Id. at 479.
88. Id. at 464.
89. Id. at 465.
90. Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, Sec. 605, 48 Stat.
1064, 1103 (1934).
91. Interestingly, this provision was not interpreted to bar federal agents from pro-
viding intercepted messages to State prosecutors for use in State criminal trials. See, e.g.,
MARC: L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGH-F, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 475 (1999).
92. See, e.g., Robert A. Pikowsky, An Overview of the Law of Electronic Surveillance Post
September 11, 2001, 94 LAw LIBR. J. 601 (2002).
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quirement for wiretap surveillance of a telephone booth. 9 That
same year, the Court decided Berger v. New York. In Berger, the
Court struck down a New York statute authorizing wiretaps based
upon "reasonable ground to believe that evidence of a crime
may be thus obtained."9 4 The Court found this statute incom-
patible with the Fourth Amendment requirement that a particu-
lar offense be identified." In addition, the Court found that the
statute failed to adequately describe the conversations to be in-
tercepted, authorized eavesdropping for a two-month period
without a particular termination date, did not provide notice to
the suspect, and raised some special circumstances, which would
obviate the need to adhere to the warrant requirement.96 For all
of these reasons, the Court struck down the New York statute as
a violation of the Fourth Amendment:
Once again, Congress responded to the Supreme Court's
lead by passing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 ("Title III"). Title III, like Katz and Berger,
recognized that wiretaps are searches requiring fidelity to the
Fourth Amendment. In particular, Title III strictly requires that
wiretaps be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral
and detached magistrate, after adherence to a carefully pre-
scribed application process. 9 Title III also incorporates the par-
ticularity requirements identified by the Supreme Court in Ber-
ger. " ° Over time, Congress has expanded federal protection to
cellular and cordless telephones.'°
This pattern of executive action, judicial decision, and Con-
gressional enactment, has also characterized the development of
93. See id. This decision was a watershed, not only because it applied Fourth
Amendment protections to wiretap surveillance, but also due to the fact that it ex-
panded those protections outside the home to a public setting.
94. Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-60.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. id.
98. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197 (1968).
99. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518 (1)-(2).
100. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518 (1) (b). This subsection requires details about the "partic-
ular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed," and a "particular
description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted," as well as any
available details about the particular target of the warrant and the nature and location
of the facilities to be placed under surveillance.
101. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510 (1); 47 U.S.C. Sec. 1001.
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controls placed upon searches conducted for the purpose of
gathering foreign intelligence information. This interaction is
discussed below.
C. The Fourth Amendment and Foreign Intelligence
That FISA originally contained a purpose requirement is
clear. 1 2 FISA applications were required to contain a certifica-
tion that "the purpose" of the surveillance sought was to obtain
foreign intelligence information. In In re Sealed Case, the court
glossed over this fact and disregarded its significance."" s This is
particularly disconcerting because this certification requirement
did not accidentally materialize in the FISA statute. Only by ig-
noring the holding of previous Supreme Court and other fed-
eral cases, could the FISCR conclude that Congress was not fol-
lowing the dictates of prior precedent when it enacted the pur-
pose requirement in the FISA statute.
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided the case
of United States v. United States District Court ("Keith case").' 4 The
Keith case and its aftermath followed the familiar pattern out-
lined above in relation to wiretap cases. In Keith, the Executive
Branch had used wiretaps authorized by the Attorney General,
but not by ajudicial officer, to conduct electronic surveillance of
U.S. persons suspected of various offenses, including the bomb-
ing of a Central Intelligence Agency office in Ann Arbor, Michi-
gan. "5 The government argued that a warrant was not required
because of the President's authority to "gather intelligence infor-
mation" and to "protect the national security."'"" 6 Instead, the
government urged the Court to permit the procedure used by
the Executive in which the Attorney General authorized wiretaps
where appropriate to combat domestic organizations seeking to
undermine or "subvert the existing structure of government." 107
The Court denied this request and made clear that the Fourth
102. See Part I.A., supra. In addition to the above discussion detailing the certifica-
tion requirement, this fact will be developed in the following discussion.
103. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723.
104. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) [hereinafter
Keith].
105. Id. at 299.
106. Id. at 300-01. The President's purported authority in this area was being exer-
cised through U.S. Attorney General, John Mitchell.
107. Id. It should be noted that the Supreme Court's decision was handed down
in 1972, a time of significant domestic unrest during which the government was forced
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Amendment's requirements that a warrant issue from a neutral
and detached magistrate upon a finding of probable cause to
believe that a crime had been committed, applied equally to the
investigation of crimes implicating domestic national security:
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be
guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be con-
ducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch.
The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive
officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magis-
trates. Their duty and responsibility are to enforce the laws,
to investigate, and to prosecute. But those charged with this
investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole
judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in
pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment, which the
Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive dis-
cretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incrimi-
nating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy
and protected speech.08
The Keith case is important not only because of its unwaver-
ing fidelity to the Fourth Amendment,' but because it is the
genesis of the "purpose requirement" contained in FISA. While
not addressing the issue directly, for it was not before the Court,
Keith repeatedly mentioned that a different set of rules may ap-
propriately apply in cases where the government is conducting
surveillance for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence in-
formation.''o
to contend with numerous domestic organizations, which were committed to active vio-
lent opposition to the United States government.
108. Id. at 316-17. This case, of course, was decided before the abuses of the
Nixon Administration during the Watergate scandal were known.
109. The Court continued:
Some have argued that "the relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." This view,
however, overlooks the second clause of the Amendment. The warrant clause
of the Fourth Amendment is not dead language. Rather, it has been "a valued
part of our constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the result in
scores and scores of cases in courts all over this country. It is not an inconve-
nience to be somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency. It is,
or should be, an important working part of our machinery of government,
operating as a matter of course to check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly
over-zealous executive officers' who are a party of any system of law enforce-
ment."
Id. at 315-16 (internal citations omitted).
110. The Court said: "As stated in the outset, this case involves only the domestic
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After the Supreme Court's decision in Keith, and prior to
the enactment of FISA, numerous federal courts of appeal af-
firmed warrantless surveillance authorized within the Executive
Branch, because the purpose of the surveillance was foreign in-
telligence gathering."' The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits all
held that warrantless surveillance could be conducted by the Ex-
ecutive Branch only if the purpose of this surveillance was to
gather foreign intelligence." 2 Though ignored by the FISCR in
In re Sealed Case, it is against this backdrop, and the findings of
the Church Committee on the Nixon Administration's abuses of
surveillance on such groups as the Democratic Party, that Con-
gress passed FISA. Congress was concerned about the Executive
Branch's improper use of surveillance powers, against political
enemies. At the same time, Congress was seeking to act in a
manner consistent with judicial rulings about the inherent
power of the Executive to act in the area of foreign affairs and
defense of the nation. The holdings of these cases are reflected
in FISA's requirement that the Executive Branch certify to the
FISC that the surveillance application is sought for foreign intel-
ligence gathering purposes."' FISCR's assertions to the con-
trary cannot change the fact that Congress was acting consist-
ently with a series of precedent in granting power to the Execu-
tive while attempting to constrain the Executive from abusing
that power in the way the Nixon Administration had." 4
D. In re Sealed Case's Specious Reasoning
An analysis of whether conducting criminal surveillance
under FISA offends the Fourth Amendment, properly rests upon
determinations of whether the process meets the requirements
aspects of national security. We have not addressed and express no opinion as to, the
issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents."
Id. at 321-22. The Court went on to note the decision in United States v. Smith, 321 F.
Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971) "for the view that warrantless surveillance, though impermis-
sible in domestic security cases, may be constitutional where foreign powers are in-
volved." Id. at 322, n.20.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871 (9th
Cir. 1977). But see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
112. See Brown, 484 F.2d at 426; Butenko, 494 F.2d at 593; Buck, 548 F.2d at 871.
113. 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1804(a) (7) (B).
114. The Nixon Administration was neither the first, nor unfortunately, the last
Administration to abuse wiretapping powers. See V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 404-10
(1971) for a discussion of wiretapping authorized by Robert Kennedy.
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of a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate; a find-
ing of probable cause to believe that a particular crime has been
committed; and an identification, with particularity, of the
places to be searched and the items or things to be seized. At-
tempts to suppress evidence obtained through FISA surveillance
have previously withstood such challenges because the purpose
requirement obviated the need for adhering to the dictates of
the Fourth Amendment.'' 5 Whether this purpose is truly re-
quired, therefore, is the crux of the analysis in In re Sealed Case
and will be the focus of our discussion as well.' 16
As noted above, the FISCR not only argued that there never
was a purpose requirement under FISA, but it also contradicted
that argument by holding that the changes to the purpose re-
quirement enacted by Congress in the PATRIOT Act in no way
undermined the constitutionality of surveillance conducted pur-
suant to FISA. This position is untenable under Supreme Court
case law and no amount of obfuscation and faulty logic can save
it. The following is a distillation of the court's rationale in In re
Sealed Case.' 7
There are certain rules mandated by the Fourth Amend-
ment that govern surveillance in criminal matters. These rules
do not apply to surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence
purposes. By definition, foreign intelligence surveillance will
frequently result in gathering information related to certain
criminal activities.'" Congress did not intend for investigators
to stop pursuing evidence of crimes uncovered during foreign
115. See, e.g., Duggan, 743 F.2d at 59.
116. While the FISCR goes to some lengths in comparing FISA proceedings to
those under Title Ill, those issues are mere "window dressing," since FISA, by its very
terms, permits surveillance to gather information on a standard less than "probable
cause to believe that a particular crime has been committed." Id. at 71-74.
117. The FISCR's slip opinion in In re Sealed Case is fifty-six pages in length. Obvi-
ously, a one paragraph distillation will eliminate many of the nuances of that opinion.
Distillation is particularly difficult in a case such as this, where the court's logic is half-
formed, inconsistent, and relies on misreading and misapplication of the law. We are
not attempting to recreate every facet of the court's reasoning. Moreover, many of
those nuances in the decision are misleading and unhelpful to an understanding of the
court's decision. We believe however, that this distillation captures the essence of the
court's opinion and allows for a more clear understanding of the court's holding than
does inuch of the opinion itself.
118. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 722-24. The court identifies within the defini-
tions of "agent of a foreign power" and "foreign intelligence information" certain
crimes that fit tinder the categories of espionage, sabotage, and terrorism.
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intelligence surveillance."' l  Therefore, the FISCR concludes,
criminal investigations may be the purpose behind surveillance
conducted without adhering to the rules mandated by the
Fourth Amendment. 120
It is the final link in this logic chain that is specious and
undermines the entire reasoning of In re Sealed Case. The court's
analysis is predicated on two faulty premises. First, because FISA
did not forbid investigators from pursuing evidence of certain
crimes that fit within the definitions of "agent of a foreign
power" and "foreign intelligence information," it is appropriate
for a criminal investigation to be the purpose behind a FISA sur-
veillance. 12' Second, the primary purpose requirement behind
FISA is not constitutionally significant. 122 The second of these
arguments is the more important for if the primary purpose re-
quirement is constitutionally significant, it matters not at all
whether the definition of "foreign intelligence information" in-
cludes evidence of enumerated crimes. Nonetheless, we will
deal with these arguments in turn.
1. Crimes Capable of Being Investigated Under FISA
The definition of "foreign intelligence information" con-
tained in FISA includes "sabotage or international terrorism by a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.' 1 23 The definition
of an "agent of a foreign power" includes any person who "know-
ingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities ...
which involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes
of the United States," or "knowingly engages in sabotage or in-
ternational terrorism."' 12  "International terrorism" is defined asincluding activities that "involve violent acts or acts dangerous to
119. Id. at 727.
120. The court asserts that it would be inappropriate for the investigation of ordi-
nary crime, unrelated to foreign intelligence, to be the primary purpose behind surveil-
lance conducted pursuant to FISA. Id. at 735-36. However, the court did nothing to so
limit the application of this decision. As will be discussed, the court in fact encouraged
the opposite result, by noting that sometimes "ordinary crimes are inextricably inter-
twined with foreign intelligence crimes" and by informing the FISC that the court must
defer to the assertion of the Executive that a significant purpose of the investigation is
foreign intelligence information. Id. at 736.
121. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735.
122. Id. at 746.
123. 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1801 (e)(1)(B).
124. 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1801 (b) (2) (A), (C).
12572003]
1258 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:1234
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State."
The first thing that should be apparent is the incredible
breadth of these definitions. "Agent of a foreign power" is de-
fined in behavioral terms, as engaged in activities, which "involve
or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United
States," or as one who engages in international terrorism. The
definition of "international terrorism" has now been expanded
to encompass any violent act that would violate the criminal laws
of the United States or of any State. The FISCR carefully de-
tailed these definitions in showing how FISA permits the investi-
gation of criminal behavior.'25 Undoubtedly, that is true, so
long as the purpose of the surveillance is foreign intelligence.
The very breadth of these statutes proves why it cannot be other-
wise.
The terms used above include definitions of criminal behav-
ior so broad, as to encompass any violation of the criminal stat-
utes of the United States, and any violent act which would violate
the criminal law of the United States or any State. It is this broad
definition of criminal behavior, that the FISCR says can now pro-
vide the purpose behind FISA surveillance. '2 6 In effect, the ex-
ception permitting investigation of some criminal activity swal-
lows the rule that foreign intelligence information should be the
primary purpose behind the surveillance. This reasoning per-
mits surveillance not governed by the dictates of the Fourth
Amendment to be used to conduct investigations which are pri-
marily criminal, so long as the Attorney General informs FISC
that "a significant purpose" behind the surveillance is also for-
eign intelligence. The court's ruling not only offends the
Fourth Amendment, but it is a tragically bad policy.
The FISCR decision in In re Sealed Case is a classic example
of a bad policy that is almost certain to wreak significant harm
upon society. The FISCR asserts that the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment are not required for FISA surveillances due, in part,
to the purported protection afforded by the Attorney General's
involvement in approving the FISA applications. The Supreme
Court, however, rejected this same argument when made by At-
torney General John Mitchell, who approved the surveillance in
125. In. re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 722-23.
126. Id.
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the Keith case. The Court noted in Keith, that the Attorney Gen-
eral was not "neutral and disinterested, and his approval could
not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment."'127 The
Court noted that the Attorney General, as a political appointee,
is more likely to be susceptible to the political pressures, and is
in a position to use his power for political ends. 128
In Keith, the Supreme Court identified some of the more
problematic effects of such a system: "[s]ecurity surveillances are
especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness of the do-
mestic security concept, the necessarily broad and continuing
nature of intelligence gathering, and the temptation to utilize
such surveillances to oversee political dissent. ' 129  As In re Sealed
Case makes clear, the definition of "foreign intelligence" is no
less vague.' :1 Nor is foreign intelligence an area where the
temptations to utilize surveillance to oversee political dissent are
less present. As the Keith Court noted, "[h]istory abundantly
documents the tendency of Government - however benevolent
and benign its motives - to view with suspicion those who most
fervently dispute its policies."'' There is ample reason to con-
clude that Attorney General John Ashcroft views with suspicion
those who dispute the Bush Administration's policies. 3 2
Whether this Attorney General yields to a temptation to investi-
gate these suspicions or not is irrelevant in a system such as ours,
where the protection of rights does not, and should not, depend
on the benevolence of those in power. Ours is a system of laws,
not of men.
2. Constitutional Limits and the Purpose Requirement
The purpose requirement is constitutionally required as any
127. Keith, 407 U.S. at 316-17. It should be noted that the Court dismissed out of
hand any question of whether a "neutral and detached magistrate" rules on the applica-
tions presented to the FISC. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 738. However, this issue may
not be as cut and dried as it might seem at first blush. There is now a twenty-four year
history of the FISC rulings on surveillance applications presented to it by the govern-
ment. After being presented with more than 4,000 applications for surveillance, the
FISC did not deny outright a single application. Four were modified, for an affirmance
rate of 99.96%. It is difficult to describe such a Court as "neutral" or "detached."
128. Keith, 407 U.S. at 316-17.
129. Keith, 407 U.S. at 320.
130. Indeed, the Keith court recognized this when noting the areas of overlap be-
tween foreign and domestic security.
131. Id. at 314.
132. See Ashcroft Statenents, supra n.2.
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fair reading of Keith will show. In fact, as Keith makes abundantly
clear, a criminal surveillance for any purpose other than foreign
intelligence, even for a purpose that directly implicates national
security, cannot escape the constraints of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The simple fact of the matter is that surveillance either
complies with the probable cause and warrant requirements of
the Fourth Amendment, or meets one of the exceptions permit-
ting surveillance in their absence. The only potential exception
routinely available for searches conducted pursuant to FISA, is
when foreign intelligence is the purpose of the surveillance. "3'
The Keith decision refers to this requirement and the subsequent
Circuit and District Court decisions spell it out carefully. 13 4
For example, in United States v. Duggan, the Second Circuit
carefully analyzed a Fourth Amendment challenge to FISA. 13 5 In
Duggan, the defendant had claimed that FISA violated the prob-
able cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.136 The Dug-
gan court traced the development of FISA. It noted the develop-
ment of case law that recognized the inherent authority of the
Executive to engage in surveillance for foreign intelligence gath-
ering purposes.' 7 After discussing the relevance of the Keith de-
cision to the development of law on this issue, the court noted
that it was "against this background" that Congress originally
passed FISA. "8
The Duggan court then analyzed the legislative history of
FISA. It noted that FISA reflected an attempt by the legislature
to "fashion a 'secure framework by which the Executive Branch
may conduct legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign intelli-
gence purposes within the context of this Nation's commitment
to privacy and individual rights." '139 After considering this his-
tory, the Second Circuit concluded that FISA was a "constitution-
133. In re Sealed Case discusses "special needs" cases; however, it does not analyze or
resolve the question of whether FISA surveillances fall within these "special needs"
cases.
134. See Troung, 629 F.2d at 908; United States v. Megahey, 533 F. Supp. 1180, 1189
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), afJ'd sub nom, United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
135. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 71-74. In Duggan, alleged members of the Provisional
Irish Republican Army challenged the constitutionality and proper application of FISA
to their case.
136. Id. at 71.
137. Id. at 72.
138. Id. at 73.
139. Id.
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ally adequate balancing of the individual's Fourth Amendment
rights against the Nation's need to obtain foreign intelligence
information."140 The FISCR ignored the constitutional basis of
the decisions in this area, instead focusing on the potential for
overlap in these types of investigations. Troung, which detailed
the proper relationship between these types of investigations
and the Fourth Amendment, was largely disregarded by the
FISCR.
In fact, much of In re Sealed Case is devoted to dismissing the
relevance of Troung. In Troung, the Fourth Circuit held that
once an investigation, which may have begun for foreign intelli-
gence purposes, becomes primarily directed toward a criminal
prosecution, the government is required to meet the standard
for a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.1 4' Ignoring the de-
velopment of the law on this issue, contained both in precedent
and in legislative history, the In re Sealed Case court stated that
Troung was the genesis of the primary purpose requirement.
142
As explained above, this simply is not the case. In any event, the
In re Sealed Case court felt compelled to find a way to distinguish
Troung.
To accomplish this task, In re Sealed Case focused on the date
of the underlying facts in Troung. Troung was decided four years
after FISA was enacted, but since it was not a FISA case, the
FISCR dismissed its analysis. However, the In re Sealed Case court
was merely seeking to avoid the valid holding of that case,
namely that warrantless surveillance runs afoul of the Fourth
Amendment when the primary purpose of the investigation is
criminal investigation, rather than foreign intelligence. In re
Sealed Case is correct that Troung was clearly not analyzing the
constitutionality of FISA. It was, however, identifying constitu-
tional minimums that are applicable to any surveillance, which is
not conducted for foreign intelligence purposes. Consistent
with the Supreme Court's holding in Keith, Troung correctly held
that any surveillance for purposes other than foreign intelli-
gence gathering requires a warrant.
In spite of Troung, the In re Sealed Case court did not deter-
mine whether a FISA surveillance order is a warrant. Pursuant to
140. Id.
141. Troung, 629 F.2d at 915.
142. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725.
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Keith and Troung, if a FISA order is not a warrant, then surveil-
lance can only be conducted for the purpose of foreign intelli-
gence gathering. If the FISA order is held to be a warrant, then
all of the requirements of a warrant, such as those articulated by
the Supreme Court in Berger, must be established. The FISCR
avoided this question because a FISA order does not meet the
probable cause, particularity, and duration requirements of a
warrant, and therefore could not justify searches for purposes
other than foreign intelligence. Rather than deal with these
facts and instead of looking at the constitutional requirements
governing criminal surveillance, the FISCR resorted to statutory
analysis. Avoidance of the constitutional requirements, however,
does not change the fact that these requirements exist and gov-
ern searches in this area.
Foreign intelligence surveillance is obviously a critical com-
ponent of an effective strategy to defend our Nation against for-
eign attack. We need our government to be effective in these
efforts, but we must also be vigilant in guarding against the
abuse of power by those who may be well-meaning, yet overzeal-
ous. We rely upon the courts to rein in those who would trample
on our Constitution in the name of national security. When the
courts fail to play their constitutional role, we are left unpro-
tected by the rule of law.
CONCLUSION
The United States and the UK, long identified as the mod-
ern world's leading lights of freedom and the rule of law, are in
the midst of dramatic transitions that may undermine those well-
deserved reputations. In the name of preserving liberty, enor-
mous powers of surveillance have been entrusted to our govern-
ments. Since September 11, 2001, those powers have been
wielded with dramatic frequency. In the United States, Congress
assisted the Bush Administration's efforts to consolidate addi-
tional power in the Executive Branch. In In re Sealed Case, the
courts have now given a green light to this transition.
The In re Sealed Case decision represents a significant step
backwards in the evolution of our democratic institutions. In
the name of security, we have forgotten the lessons of our his-
tory. The FISCR has effectively told us that the Constitution
need not control the conduct of criminal surveillance in the
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United States. Instead, through a policy of judicial deference to
executive assertions, we should trust that the Attorney General
will authorize such surveillance only when it is appropriate. If
the Executive Branch's history of abusing surveillance powers
were not so recent, it would perhaps be understandable that our
vigilance against potential tyranny and oppression might wane.
It wasn't so long ago, in the midst of a period of great domestic
turmoil, that the Keith case was decided. The Supreme Court
cautioned us then:
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of sub-
jection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the
fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous cit-
izen dissent and discussion of Government action in private
conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public
discourse, is essential to our free society. 143
This warning came but thirty years ago. Less time than that
has passed since the issuance of the Church Committee's report
detailing the abuses of surveillance power by the same executive
officials who had urged the Court in Keith to adopt a policy of
deference to the Executive Branch in matters of national secur-
ity.
To those who believe that the past is the past, and doubt
that our current political leaders would ever abuse their powers
to investigate political dissenters the way previous Administra-
tions have, one need look no further than the words of our cur-
rent Attorney General for a response. In testimony before Con-
gress, this is how John Ashcroft described those who disagreed
with the Administration's policies of detention without charge
and the planned use of military tribunals:
To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost
liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists for
they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve ...
They give ammunition to America's enemies and pause to
America's friends. 144
Our current Attorney General believes that those who engage in
political dissent in this country "aid terrorists." These comments
eerily echo comments made by the very Administration, whose
abuses of surveillance were the genesis of FISA. In 1972, White
143. Keith, 407 U.S. at 314.
144. Ashcrofl Statements, supra n.2
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House official H.R. Haldeman said that the critics of President
Nixon's Vietnam peace plan were "consciously aiding and abet-
ting the enemy of the U.S. '1 45 Make no mistake, under In re
Sealed Case, if the Attorney General were to certify that a target
identified in a FISA application was aiding terrorists, this would
provide sufficient grounds for approval of that requested surveil-
lance.
The FISCR has admonished the lower court judges to defer
to the Attorney General in determining whether there exists a
significant purpose of foreign intelligence behind an application
for FISA surveillance. In effect, the FISCR is telling the lower
court judges to "trust" the Attorney General. Trust is a wonder-
ful thing to base your personal relationships upon; it is not the
proper basis for a system of law. This Nation has been great for
over two hundred years because of our fidelity to the rule of law.
We are witnessing our Nation in transition from a system of law,
to one based upon extra-constitutional authority, justified by an
open-ended state of emergency. In the past, Americans have
trusted the courts to rein in overzealous agents of government
prone to tyranny and oppression. In this instance, we have rea-
son to fear that our trust may be misplaced.
145. N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1972, at 1, Column 8; see also Keith, 407 U.S. at 331, nlI
(Douglas, J. concurring).
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